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Abstract 
Consensus Ad Idem, legally defined as „meeting of minds‟, 
at the time of the formation of a contract, warrants a 
cardinal jurisprudential question which transcends its 
mere literal meaning. In Indian Contract Law, the trend 
has followed the test of objectivity, whereby it is not the 
actual intent of the party or parties that enter into the 
contract that is the subject of judicial evaluation, but it is 
what a reasonable man would deliberate in the peculiar 
circumstances of the case. However, the evaluation of 
telephonic conversations merit intrinsic jurisprudential 
insight. While applying the objective test, the questions 
that arise are - is there legal certainty of assent to a 
contract over telephonic conversations i.e. whether there 
is free consent.  Do the parties have the capacity to 
contract over telephone? What are the liabilities of the 
telephone operator and his legal bond to the contract 
between two or more contracting parties? Does it amount 
to violation of the fundamental rights to freedom of 
speech and expression and the right to privacy? The 
authors attempt to provide an objective analysis of 
communication in contracts over telephonic means and 
the constitutional environment embedded therein. To this 
end, a plea for due diligence prior to the formation of 
telephonic contracts shall be made in order to bring 
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objectivity to the judicial evaluation of telephonic 
contracts.  
Keywords: Contracts, Information Technology Act 2000, Liabilities, 
Objective Test, Right to Privacy, Telephonic Contract, Consensus Ad 
Idem 
I. Introduction 
The Honourable Supreme Court of India in the case of Bhagwandas 
Goverdhandas Kedia v. M/S. Girdharilal Parshottamdas1 has held that at 
the time of drafting the Indian Contract Act in 1872, instantaneous 
means of communication such as the telephone was not known 
while drafting the sections dealing with communication.  
Section 4 of the Indian Contract Act is a corollary of the above 
statement, as it reads: 
“Communication when complete - The 
communication of a proposal is complete when it 
comes to the knowledge of the person to whom it is 
made.  
The communication of an acceptance is complete, as 
against the proposer, when it is put in a course of 
transmission to him so as to be out of the power of 
the acceptor; as against the acceptor, when it comes 
to the knowledge of the proposer.” 
As the above provision is devoid of any specification with regard to 
the modes of transmission of proposals or acceptances, certain 
exceptions have been drawn in favour of the laws governing 
communications of Indian contracts. Regarding an offer and its 
acceptance, Anson2 has given an analogy of a lighted match stick. 
“Acceptance is to an offer what a lighted match is to a train of 
gunpowder. It produces something which can‟t be recalled or 
undone.” An acceptance turns the offer into a binding obligation. 
                                                          
1 Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia v. M/S. Girdharilal Parshottamdas, 
AIR 1966 SC 543. 
2 JACK BEATSON, ANDREW BURROWS & JOHN CARTWRIGHT, ANSON‟S LAW OF 
CONTRACT (Oxford University Press, London, 29th ed., 2010). 
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In case of contracts made via telegraph, the contract is complete 
where the acceptance is made and not where it is received.3 As 
acceptance and not an offer is the subject that gives rise to a cause 
of action4, the contract in case of telegraph is completed, even 
before it comes to the knowledge of the proposer, as long as the 
acceptor has put his assent in transmission beyond his control. The 
reason for this exception drawn in favour of telegram can be 
encapsulated by words of Hidayatullah J. in the Kedia5 case: 
The rule about lost letters of acceptance was made 
out of expediency because it was easier in 
commercial circles to prove the dispatch of letters 
but very difficult to disprove a statement that the 
letter was not received.  
Similarly, the Allahabad High Court has applied the postal rule 
even to email communication.6 Further, Section 13(1) of the 
Information Technology Act, 2000 holds that the dispatch of an 
electronic record occurs when it enters a computer source outside 
the control of the originator. This implies that a contract via email is 
enforceable once it is sent out of the control of the offeree.  
However, the postal rule does not apply in case of telephonic 
contracts. In the Kedia7 judgment, the majority held that as both the 
parties had clear communication of the offer and the acceptance of 
the contract, the same was deemed to be completed where the 
proposer received the knowledge of the assent by the acceptor and 
not by the mere transmission of the assent via telephonic dispatch. 
The court held that since the dispatch of acceptance via telephone is 
instantaneous with no third party intervention i.e. the postal 
department, it is analogous to contracts made in physical presence. 
Though this holds as a sound judgement,  an acceptance over a 
telephonic conversation cannot be marred by loss in signals, 
environmental disturbances, and the like. The question that begs 
                                                          
3 American Pipe Co. v. State of U.P., AIR 1983 Cal 186. 
4 Republic Medico Surgical Co. v. UOI, AIR 1980 Karn 168.  
5 Supra note 1. 
6 PR Transport v. UOI, AIR 2006 All 23.  
7 Supra note 1. 
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attention is, whether the telephonic contract has been assented to 
without free consent or in the absence of knowledge regarding the 
capacity of the parties.  As there is such a limited time frame 
between the transmission of assent and its receipt by the proposer, 
there is hardly any scope for evaluation of the circumstances the 
acceptor may be placed in, or the devious means of contracting the 
offeror / offeree may adopt at the time of contracting.  
The Kedia8 Judgment itself was decreed on the understanding that 
there was utmost clarity in communication between the contracting 
parties. However, does mere clarity of speech encapsulate the legal 
yardsticks of contracts over the telephone? Is Vou et praeterea nihil 
viz. a voice and nothing more, a valid legal proof of evidence to a 
contract over the telephone? Is it legally justified for the offeror to 
hear the assent of the offeree even in case of the risk of the 
telephone lines being severed? The fallacies that these questions 
highlight are that, the instantaneous mode of telephonic contracts 
should not negate the postal rule merely due to the transmission 
between the offeror and the offeree having no lapse of time.  
II. The Objective Test under Indian Contract Law 
According to the Indian Contract Act, 1872 “An Agreement 
enforceable by law is a contract”.9 The process begins with a 
proposal to obtain the assent of another to an act or abstinence.10 
The proposal when accepted becomes a promise.11 The person 
making the proposal is the „promisor‟, and the person accepting the 
proposal is the „promisee‟.12 The act or abstinence related to a 
promise is called the consideration for the promise.13 The promise 
may be expressed or implied.14 The promise or every set of 
promises that forms the consideration for each other, is an 
                                                          
8 Supra note 1. 
9 Indian Contract Act, 1872, § 2 (h). 
10 Id at § 2 (a). 
11 Id. at § 2 (b). 
12 Id. at § 2 (c). 
13 Id. at § 2 (d). 
14 Id. at § 9. 
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agreement.15 An agreement becomes a contract when it is made by 
the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful 
consideration, with a lawful object, and if the contract is not being 
expressly declared as void. 16 
With regard to telephonic contracts, the High Court of Madhya 
Pradesh has held that, if, during the conversation the telephone 
lines go „dead‟ so that the offerer does not hear the offeree‟s word 
of acceptance, there is no contract at that moment.17 It is quite 
evident that the question of implied offers over telephones does not 
arise, as there is no evaluation of one‟s conduct. But, yet again the 
question of evidence has been answered by mere clarity of speech. 
Does free consent, capacity of the parties, and lawful consideration, 
emerge from an authentic recording? The lack of elaboration with 
regard to telephonic contracts which are expressly declared as void 
or which contain an illegal object is because the evidence for the 
same is a statutory or judicial declaration/ pronouncement. Thus, 
the feasibility of such evidence is present in the written law itself.  
In case of contracts made in person, a valid consideration is the test 
that determines whether a contract has taken place or not.18 A valid 
consideration is the price of the promise19, without which, the 
performance of any promise is nothing but lip service. In Chappell & 
Co. Ltd v. Nestle Co. Ltd,20  it was held that a "peppercorn does not 
cease to be good consideration if it is established that the promisee 
does not like pepper and will throw away the corn." In India, the 
courts have even applied the principle of implied consideration, 
whereby, a voluntary service done in the past implies the need for 
payment.21 Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act itself forbids any 
agreement without consideration unless it is in writing and 
                                                          
15 Id. at § 2 (e).  
16 Id. at §10. 
17 Kanhaiyala J v. Dineshwarchandra, AIR 1959 M.P. 234.  
18 CWT v. Abdul Hussain Mulla Muhammad Ali, (1988) 3 SCC 562.  
19 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK,  POLLOCK ON CONTRACTS 133 (LexisNexis 13th ed. 
2012).  
20 Chappell & Co. Ltd v. Nestle Co. Ltd., 1960 AC 87. 
21 Upton-on-Severn RDC v. Powell, (1942) 1 All ER 220.  
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registered, made on account of natural love or affection; is a 
promise to compensate for something done as a past service or is a 
promise to pay a time barred debt, i.e., a debt barred by the law of 
limitation.  
The legal malady encountered in case of telephonic contracts is that 
even if the consideration is agreed to be paid on performance of the 
promise of the promisor, there emerges a lack of evidence to prove 
the existence of the agreement unless, the conversation is recorded. 
In the absence of a recording, the courts will rely on the evidence of 
consideration which, in itself, does not definitively prove the 
existence of an agreement as there is  lack of physical documents to 
ascertain the same. The Supreme Court, however, apart from the 
presence of an agreement and a valid consideration, has adopted a 
third parameter for the evaluation of the existence of a contract i.e. 
the intention to create Vinculum jurie or a legal bond or relation.  
Here it is not the mere intention of either of the parties, but their 
intention to create legal relations.22 The difference between the two 
lies in the fact that the former is a subjective cognitive expression of 
the parties at the time of the formation of the contract, while the 
latter provides rights to either of the parties even in the absence of 
the narration of such rights. A cardinal case of contracts that is 
exemplar of the objective test is the Lalman Shukla v. Gauri Dutt 23, 
decided by the Allahabad High Court. Here, the servant i.e. the 
plaintiff in the case was not permitted to recover the award from 
the defendant on finding his lost nephew, as he claimed the 
reward, after finding the boy. Thus, by applying the objective test, 
his initial intention was not to gain the reward notified by the 
defendant, but to return the boy. As the defendant had explicitly 
offered to provide Rs. 501/- by handbills to anyone who found the 
boy, the right to claim the award would emerge only if one had 
accepted the offer first. Thus, it is an objective and not a subjective 
test that the Indian courts apply, as has been evolved and 
developed in England.24  
                                                          
22 Supra note 1. 
23 Lalman Shukla v. Gauri Dutt, (1913) 11 All LJ 489.  
24 Supra note 21. 
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III. Novel Instruments of Objectivity 
The determination of speech amounting to an objective evaluation 
of an intention to create legal relations in telephonic contracts, is 
fraught with challenges. With regard to free consent, under section 
13 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 there is no objective evaluation 
of whether the consent/offer over the telephone has been obtained 
by coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or mistake. 
Even if the aggrieved party decides to make the contract voidable 
under section 19 or section 19–A of the Indian Contract Act, the 
burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove the aforementioned 
parameters against free consent is as high as that of criminal law 
with regards to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.25 Thus, the 
argument boils down to the most feasible means of evidential 
material that can bring certainty that there was free assent or a 
valid offer and thereby a valid intention to create legal relations. 
The Supreme Court of India has held recording of conversations 
that are valid to the material facts of the case, as admissible 
evidence under section 7 of the Indian Evidence Act.26 The 
Supreme Court has given further guidelines that the voice of the 
speaker on the recorded evidence must be clearly identifiable, 
audible and clear. In the absence of which, the recorded evidence 
would be subject to strict proof.27 However, apart from authenticity 
and clarity of the recorded conversation, the Supreme Court of 
India has not laid down any guidelines for the strict proof of 
identity of the contracting parties over the telephone. Further, does 
the authentic recording of the conversation amount to a valid 
evidence to prove the existence of a contract?  
A recording in isolation is no ground to definitively prove the 
capacity of the parties or whether there was free consent. Further, 
the recording of a conversation is not a statutory requirement in 
case of telephonic contracts as it is considered as a contract made in 
physical presence under Section 4 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 
This leaves the evidence of recording in the hands of the parties 
                                                          
25 Krishna Wanti v. LIC, AIR 2000 Del 63.  
26 R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 1 SCC 471. 
27 Ram Singh v. Col. Ram Singh, 1985 Supp SCC 611. 
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themselves, which opens the gates for the tampering of evidential 
material. It should be noted that the Supreme Court does not 
permit a tampered recording as valid evidence in the court of law28. 
However, this does not prevent the parties of the contract from 
committing the act, thereby vitiating the validity of a sound 
evidence for contracts over the telephone.  
With respect to contracts via email, section 12 of the Information 
Technology Act, 2000 provides for a receipt of acknowledgment of 
the electronic record sent by the originator to the addressee. In the 
absence of which, the contract fails to be binding. This brings an 
element of reasonable due diligence on part of the originator and 
the addressee to ensure the certainty of the receipt of the 
acknowledgment of the details of the contract. Thereafter, if an 
assent is given, it is presumed that the addressee has assented to all 
the terms in the contract because he had previously sent an 
acknowledgement to the originator with regards to the receipt of 
his offer. Section 65-B of the said Act permits the admissibility of an 
electronic record in case of a court proceeding. Here, the receipt of 
acknowledgment too can be received without free consent or 
without ascertaining the consent of the parties. However, the said 
Act has ensured a prior step of due diligence of evidence to create a 
legal whetting system to avoid voidability. In this regard, the court, 
while evaluating the circumstances may rely on the receipt of 
acknowledgement as valid evidence to prove that there was 
intention to create legal relations devoid of the subjective 
circumstances.  However, in case of telephonic contracts, apart 
from recording of the contractual conversation, the question that 
merits attention is whether the testimony of a witness to a 
telephonic conversation or a telephone operator himself can act as 
valid evidence to the existence of the oral contract that took place.  
As far as contractual laws in India are concerned, the question 
remains unsettled apart from the mere application of section 4 of 
the Indian Contract Act to telephonic contracts and the clarity of 
speech over the telephone amounting to a valid assent/offer.   
                                                          
28 Id. 
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 The Honourable court of Kentucky had confronted the issue in the 
Sullivan v. Kuykendall29 case. The court held that if a person asks the 
operator to repeat his message to a third person, he is bound by the 
words of the operator, even though he does not consent with the 
instructions given at a later point of time. Here, the operator was 
held to be the agent of the person giving the instructions and his 
testimony was not held to be mere hearsay evidence. Expanding 
the Kuykendall30 case, as there was a third party intervention, there 
emerges a reasonable due diligence undertaken by the offeror or 
offeree because in such a case, the operator can act as a witness of 
the conversation that had taken place. Further, in People v. Ward,31 a 
criminal case, the court held that the fact that the witness, in his 
testimony, was able to identify the prisoner/defendant over the 
phone along with the second witness‟ testimony, who was standing 
six inches away from the first witness, amounted to a valid 
evidence of identification. The legal loophole that arises here is that 
mimicry is not taken into consideration if the person receiving the 
information via the telephone identifies the voice under the guise 
of it being somebody else‟s. This provides not only an undue 
advantage to the witness who provides the evidence but also 
resorts the test of objectivity to a subjective and biased witness.  
IV. Recommendations  
The platform for strengthening objectivity in telephonic contracts is 
to have a certain amount of prior due diligence undertaking, by all 
the contracting parties so that in case of a breach, an objective 
provision of valid evidence is present. To this end, a third party 
impartial witness to all telephonic contracts or detailed guidelines 
for recording, must be laid down by the Supreme Court. This, 
however, should not be considered as a panacea for all breaches of 
telephonic contracts. Contracts over all electronic means are always 
subject to and prone to fraudulent activities. But, the state, in the 
least can ensure evidential mechanisms to create a whetting system 
prior to the formation of the contract.  
                                                          
29 Sullivan v. Kuykendall, 82 Ky., 483. 
30 Id. 
31 People v. Ward, 3 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 483, 511. 
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To this end, a mechanism whereby the telephone operator can 
ensure the capacity of the parties before the contract fructifies can 
be a fruitful and legally concrete exercise in order to avoid 
voidability. However, ascertaining the capacity of the parties over 
the telephone without documents authenticating the same renders 
our suggestions to only a third party entity bearing witness to the 
telephonic conversation that forms the contract. This might amount 
to hearsay evidence. In this regard, the telephone operator can in 
the least serve as a vigilance system weeding out the parties that 
are not competent to contract before the formation of the contract. 
For this, the operator must contain a repository of information 
regarding both parties derived from Aadhaar card information or 
any of the like kind. In effect, every party contracting over the 
telephone would have to have a registered document of identity 
with the Government to assure their competency to contract. 
Further, it is imperative that the postal rule be applied even to 
telephonic contracts as the operator can ensure as a matter of 
evidence that the assent was sent rather than the offeror proving 
that he received it by the telephone operator.  
V. Right to Privacy 
With regard to the above recommendations, certain constitutional 
questions must be brought to the fore. The third party intervention 
raises the question of the right to privacy, as a contract between 
two or more private individuals and is a matter that should be 
devoid of state intervention. However, the right to privacy has been 
held not to be an absolute right and is subject to reasonable 
restrictions.32 With regards to recording, section 5(2) of the Indian 
Telegraph Act, 1885, permits the Government to intercept any 
telegraphic messages in times of public emergency. The section has 
even been applied to telephonic interceptions by the Government. 
In 1997, the Supreme Court while maintaining phone tapping as a 
serious invasion of the right to privacy, upheld the constitutionality 
of the aforementioned section.33 Following the strict guidelines laid 
down by the court, the Central Government passed a notification in 
                                                          
32 Supra note 4. 
33 People‟s Union of Civil Liberties v. UOI, AIR 1997 SC 568. 
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2007 amending the rule 419 of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951, 
and adding rule 419 A. The said amendment brought certain levels 
of vigilance before the authorisation of phone tapping.  
As per the amendment, a requisition of interception can be sent 
only by the two appointed nodal officers in each law enforcement 
agency, who cannot be under the rank of a Superintendent or 
additional superintendent of Police. Further, such an order for 
interception can only come from the Secretary to the Government 
of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs, or from the Secretary of 
the State Government, in-charge of the Home Department or the 
Joint Secretary to the Government of India, in case of unavoidable 
circumstances. A receipt of requisition by a law enforcement 
agency is to be handled by two senior executives of the company of 
the service provider, who are to act as nodal officers in the 
designated area.  An acknowledgment receipt must be provided to 
the law enforcement agency within two hours of the receipt of the 
said requisition.  
A Review Committee comprising of the Cabinet Secretary as the 
Chairman, Secretary to the Government of India in–charge, Legal 
Affairs, and Secretary to the Government of India, Department of 
Telecommunications, was also instituted. A State review body 
comprising of analogous positions has also been established.  
Lastly, guidelines of recording of reasons for interceptions, internal 
whetting mechanisms for checking unauthorized interceptions, and 
permissibility of tapping only when all other means are exhausted 
have also been made. 34 
At the outset, it should be noted that if the parties have consented 
to the recording by the third party Governmental agency, then the 
question of  right to privacy does not arise as this is a voluntary 
provision for disclosure of information. However, to provide a 
recommendation for all telephonic contracts to have a state entity 
as a third party witness, necessarily implies that the Government 
must intervene in every contract. If the consideration is with 
regards to contracts made with the Government, then it implies  
                                                          
34 Ministry of communications and information technology, Government 
of India, http://www.dot.gov.in/sites/ default/files/ march 2007.pdf, 
(last visited on April 22,2017). 
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violation of right to privacy , as this serves as a prior establishment 
of evidence in case of a potential breach. However, in case of 
private contracts, the question arises as to whether such 
Governmental interference is permissible.  If not, the argument 
with regards to the right to privacy remains pertinent. 
One of the established cardinal principle is that, if the public 
interest warrants, and the transaction is of public nature, as in the 
case of public Corporations or Bodies, whether such Corporation or 
Body is  funded and controlled by the State or not, then public 
interest outweighs private interest. Hence, one argument in favour 
of the Government is that in case of any public emergency, such a 
recording can be justified with respect to the aforementioned 
amendment. However, as a public emergency is not a pre–requisite 
to any contract or an event that is always at the Government‟s 
disposal, state intervention for the purpose of evidential material to 
strengthen the objectivity of Consensus Ad Idem over telephonic 
contracts must be deliberated upon.  
It is a matter of settled law that a fundamental right exists only 
against the state and not private individuals.35 However, the courts 
have intervened in a multitude of cases where there have been 
serious violations of fundamental rights by private individuals and 
have broadened the definition of „State‟ under Article 12.36 The line 
of argument in majority of the cases is that state inaction cannot 
escape the liability of the violation of a fundamental right. The 
same line of thought is followed with respect to criminal cases 
whereby the victim is represented by the state. However, such an 
intervention is justified only if the gravity of the crime violates a 
fundamental right. Hence, the applicability of phone tapping is 
only in cases of public emergency and when all other means are 
exhausted.  
To adopt the strict guidelines of the 2007 notification regarding 
recording of telephonic conversations that lead to the formation of 
contracts is to protect the person from voidability itself. To this end, 
                                                          
35 P.D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India, AIR 1952 SC 59.  
36 People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, (1982) 3 
S.C.C.235; Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, AIR 1978 SC 597; Olga Tellis v. 
Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1986 AIR 180.  
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every contract over the telephone would be ironclad thereby 
making business more feasible. Under the Telecom Regulation 
Authority of India (TRAI) Act 1997, section 12 provides TRAI the 
powers to conduct investigations and to call for information with 
regards to service providers/ telephone operators. The said section 
does not deal with recording of conversation.  
However, if a contract is completed but the lines are severed, the 
liability may come upon the service provider. But, such liability can 
be evaded by establishment of due diligence by the service 
provider that the recording of the conversation between the 
contracting parties were available to the same. Thus, in case of a 
breach, the operator will not be held liable or legally bound as 
either of the parties had the option of obtaining the recording for 
the purpose of declaring their contract voidable. In this regard the 
service provider would only be a distributor of information and not 
a publisher.37 Further, under Section 12 (4) of the said act, the 
authority has the power to issue such directions to service 
providers as it may consider necessary for proper functioning by 
them. If a direction is given by TRAI with regards to recording, 
they have the defence of avoiding liability in case of lines being 
severed, even in case of private contracts, as every telephone 
operator, be it public or private, is under TRAI regulations. Thus, 
such Governmental interference has precedence over the right to 
privacy as soon as the parties contracted have assented to such 
interference over the telephone for the want of evidential material 
on their part and the exemption of liability on part of the 
Government. In this regard, it has to be noted that the legislature 
should employ nodal agencies in case of all contracts made over the 
telephone. Even in the absence of intra-nodal agencies in 
companies or firms, there should be a nodal agency that can be 
communicated with, during the formation of the contract over the 
telephone so that the parties can ensure that their contract is devoid 
of any ambiguity. With respect to  the postal rule, such an agency 
can hold as evidence that the assent was indeed sent to the offeror. 
                                                          
37 Cubby Inc v. Compuserve Inc., 776 F Supp 13; Zeran v. America Online 
Inc 129 F 3d 327. 
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 With respect to jurisdiction of the court, the place at which the 
assent is sent, shall preside, if a cause of action shall arise. To this 
end, it is imperative that at the time of the formation of the 
contract, the nodal agency where the offeree resides must be 
contacted for the purpose of territorial and evidential feasibility. In 
case the telephone lines are severed, the representative of such 
nodal agency can appear as a witness to the same. A legislation that 
requires the authentication and legal compulsion of a recording in 
case of telephonic contracts will in itself be a mechanism to prove 
consensus ad idem. If such a mechanism is established, it mitigates 
the clarity of one‟s speech being the only evidence towards the 
establishment of a contract over the telephone. Once such 
legislation is passed, it becomes immaterial if the consent to such a 
recording was given or whether one‟s right to privacy is infringed 
or not, as it would amount to the ignorance of the law. In effect, 
there would be a mutuality of obligation on part of both the 
contracting parties to ensure the evidence of their conversation and 
also the legal justification for the power and authority to enter into 
such a contractual obligation. In effect, there is a hybrid of double 
due diligence, where not only is the conversation to the contract 
recorded but also the operator ascertains the authenticity of the 
same.  
As per Section 107 of the Uniform Computer Information 
Transaction Act (CITA), 2002, a uniform Act passed by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the United 
States, a party to a contract is given the autonomy, in any 
transaction, to establish requirements regarding the authentication 
or record acceptable to the same. Further, even if the other party is 
unaware of such a record, he is bound by the electronic agent used. 
The particular section, however, does permit the tampering of a 
recording to be binding on the party not aware of it. In avoidance 
of the same, in case of the establishment of the nodal agencies, 
TRAI itself can function as a review body in matters of tampering 
of the evidence. In this way, every party contracting over the 
telephone would give up their right to privacy for the want of 
evidence material, which TRAI can be permitted to investigate 
under Section 12.  




In the light of the arguments presented, the authors feel that 
Section 12 of the TRAI Act, 1997 should be amended, to include, 
recording by service providers of telephonic conversations dealing 
with contracts. Alternatively, the Law Commission should 
recommend, or the Supreme Court should take suo motto 
cognizance, and lay detailed guidelines and direct the legislature to 
initiate steps to come out with a lucid legislation on the subject 
matter. The ultimate implication would be that the recording of the 
telephonic conversation that leads to the formation of a contract 
would become a pre-requisite to all contracts entered through this 
mode or channel, rather than it being an initiative taken by one of 
the contracting parties.  
 
 
 
